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COMMENTARY
THE "LAW" ON LAWYER EFFORTS
TO DISCREDIT TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY
CARL M. SELINGER*
[The advocate] plays his role badly, and trespasses against the
obligations of professional responsibility, when his desire to win leads
him to muddy the headwaters of decision ....
- Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint [A.B.A.-A.A.L.S.] Conference,
44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958).
A lawyer shall not knowingly... make a false statement of material
fact... to a tribunal ...
A lawyer shall not ... unlawfully... destroy or conceal a document
or other material having potential evidentiary value....
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... engage in conduct
involving... misrepresentation....
- Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(a), 8.4(c) (1983).
While many lawyers would refuse to do so, there is no legal rule
prohibiting a lawyer from cross-examining a witness with respect to
testimony that the lawyer knows to be truthful. In examining a witness,
a lawyer may use customary forensic techniques, including harsh
implied criticism of the witness' testimony, character or capacity for
truth-telling.
- Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 152 cmt. d. (Council Draft No.
9, 1992)
No, I don't really believe that a lawyer who attempted by cross-examination or
impeachment of a witness to discredit testimony that he/she knew was truthful
would be subject to professional discipline under Model Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3A(a), or
8.4(c). Before a lawyer's professional livelihood is adversely affected, he/she is
certainly entitled (perhaps constitutionally entitled) to more notice than that -
especially when a great many lawyers think the practice in question is a quite
acceptable part of the adversary system.' Nor do I think that the lawyer should fear
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University. J.D., 1958, Harvard University; A.B., 1955, University
of California at Berkeley.
1. This observation is based on the general tenor of the discussion of RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 152 cmt. d (Preliminary Draft No. 7, 1991), at the meeting of the American Law
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
discipline under Model Rule 4.4 for using "means that have no substantial purpose
other than to embarrass ... a third person ... ." Almost always, the lawyer does
have another purpose: to win for his/her client.
That being said however, it seems to me quite a different thing for the proposed
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers to conclude that a lawyer "may" cross-
examine truthful witnesses, and is "entitled" to do so through "harsh implied
criticism" of the witness' truthfulness, which is what the 1991 Preliminary Draft
said,2 or even to conclude as the 1992 Council Draft No. 9 does that "there is no
legal rule prohibiting" such conduct? If the practice is profoundly at odds with
what the disciplinary rules do say, if there is little legal authority of other kinds
supporting it, if the single justification offered in bar association and judicial
authority applies only to criminal cases, and if even that justification is not
persuasive, I think that a restatement of the law governing lawyers should say so.
In this commentary, I want to discuss briefly the policy reasons for trying to
prevent lawyers from using cross-examination or impeachment to discredit truthful
testimony; the practicality of a prohibition that would apply only when a lawyer
"knows" the truth; the arguments that have been advanced for allowing lawyers to
discredit truthful testimony; the authority that has been relied upon in support of the
proposition that discrediting truthful testimony is legally permissible; and the
practical significance of having a professional prohibition against discrediting
truthful testimony that could rarely, if ever, be enforced.
Policy Reasons for Trying to Prevent Lawyers
From Discrediting Truthful Testimony
The most thoughtful discussion of the ethics of trying to discredit truthful
testimony can be found in the commientary following Standard 7.6 of the original
1971 version of the American Bar Association's Standards for the [Criminal]
Defense Function. After consulting with "a number of leading American and British
trial lawyers," the Advisory Committee concluded in Standard 7.6(b) that "[a
lawyer] should not misuse the power of cross-examination or impeachment by
employing it to discredit or undermine a witness if he knows the witness is
testifying truthfully."4
In support of this conclusion, the commentary stressed two policies. First, there
is the policy against destroying truthful evidence, which is embodied today in Model
Rule 3.4(a). The commentary reasoned that "[c]ross-examination and impeachment
are legal tools which are a monopoly of licensed lawyers, given for the high
purpose of exposing falsehood, not to destroy truth . . . ."' Second, there is the
Institute's Members Consultative Group, on September 13, 1991.
2. RESTATEMENT OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 152 cmt. d. (Preliminary Draft No. 7, 1991).
3. RESTATEMENT OF TIE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 152 cmt. d. (Council Draft No. 9, 1992)
[hereinafter 1992 RESTATBENT DRAF'].
4. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
Compilation, at 270 (Approved Draft, 1971) [hereinafter 1971 STANDARDS].
5. Id. at 272.
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policy against discouraging truthful witnesses from coming forward - a policy that
came sharply to our attention during the recent confirmation hearings for Supreme
Court Justice Clarence Thomas. "The policy of the law is to encourage witnesses
to come forward and give evidence in litigation. If witnesses are subjected to
needless humiliation when they testify, the existing human tendency to avoid
'becoming involved' will be increased."6
Further, with respect to the truth-finding function of judicial proceedings, I think
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that courtroom statements by lawyers implying
that a witness's truthful assertions of fact are not truthful comprise a species of false
statements of fact to a tribunal, which are condemned by Model Rule 3.3(a)(1). And
the use of impeachment to suggest to a trier of fact that a truthful witness is not
being truthful certainly seems to constitute "conduct involving ... misrepresenta-
tion," which is prohibited by Model Rule 8.4(c). Reflecting later on an actual case
in which he might as defense counsel have attempted by cross-examination and
impeachment to discredit the testimony of a truthful rape victim, Harry Subin has
written,
I was prepared to stand before the jury posing as an officer of the court
in search of the truth, while trying to fool the jurors into believing a
wholly fabricated story, i.e., that the woman had consented, when in
fact she had been forced at gunpoint to have sex with the defendant.7
When Would a Lawyer "Know" That a Witness is Telling the Truth?
Usually, the way that a lawyer would know that a witness is testifying truthfully
- and the way that Subin knew - would be the same way that a lawyer would
know that his/her client intended to testify or had already testified falsely, i.e.,
perjuriously: The benchmark for judging whether the testimony in question is
truthful would be what the lawyer's own client had told him/her. As the com-
mentary to the original version of Defense Standard 7.6 observed, "A prosecution
witness . . .may testify in a manner which confirms precisely what the defense
lawyer has learned from his own client and has substantiated by investigation."'
Are self-incriminatory factual statements by clients to their lawyers always
truthful? Certainly not. But in the situations in which the discrediting issue comes
up, we are not dealing with defendants who may be motivated to lie by a desire to
be punished - in order to protect someone else, get attention, or just respond to
pressure. We are dealing instead with defendants who want to get off, and it's
difficult indeed to understand why they would want to falsely incriminate
themselves. Of course, one can always come up with far-fetched hypotheticals in
which truly innocent defendants are mistaken factually about their own guilt.
Monroe Freedman imagines, for example, a defendant who knows "that he pulled
6. Id. at 273.
7. Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the "Right" to Present
a False Case, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHcs 125, 135 (1987).
8. 1971 STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 272.
1993]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the trigger and that the victim was killed, but not that his gun was loaded with
blanks and that the fatal shot was fired from across the street."9 But even Freedman
apparently would not have us tailor our day-to-day rules of professional responsibili-
ty to fit such hypotheticals.0
Indeed, I would be prepared to argue that respect for a client's autonomy requires
that statements by a client to a lawyer that the client insists are true should almost
always be taken as controlling in terms of the lawyer's professional responsibilities.
And that proposition cuts both ways.
I am very disturbed by the possible implications of the provision in Model Rule
3.3(c) that "[a] lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably
believes is false." What kind of Kafkaesque world would it be in which an honest
client might have to persuade a lawyer that his/her story is not implausible, on pain
of not getting legal assistance in telling it in court? Could a lawyer just not inform
a client about a witness with testimony favorable to the client, and consistent with
the client's story, when the lawyer "reasonably believes [the testimony] is false"?
But just as a client should be entitled to expect that his/her lawyer will act on the
basis of what the client says is true, a client should have to accept that his/her
statements will also limit what a lawyer can do.
Policy Arguments in Favor of Allowing Lawyers to Discredit Truthful Testimony
One argument in favor of permitting the discrediting practice that is applicable
to civil as well as criminal cases is an argument based on the principle of confiden-
tiality. Thus, Monroe Freedman says that
the same policy that supports the obligation of confidentiality precludes
the attorney from prejudicing his client's interest in any other way
because of knowledge gained in his professional capacity. When a
lawyer fails to cross-examine only because his client, placing confidence
in the lawyer, has been candid with him, the basis for such confidence
and candor collapses. Our legal system cannot tolerate such a result."
But what about a lawyer disclosing a client's perjury when the lawyer knows it's
perjury because of the client's previous candid statements to the lawyer? Freedman
is consistent: no disclosure of client perjury. 2 The Model Rules, however, require
disclosure. 3 And once a lawyer has to tell a client, "If you tell me that something
9. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 Micli. L. REv. 1469, 1472 (1966).
10. Id.; see also Carl M. Selinger, Criminal Lawyers' Truth: A Dialogue on Putting the Prosecution
to Its Proof on Behalf of Admittedly Guilty Clients, 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 57, 67-68 (1978).
11. Freedman, supra note 9, at 1474-75.
12. Id. at 1477-78.
13. Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) states in part: "If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures." MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
sioNAL CoNDucr Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983). The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
has concluded that the rule requires disclosure to the court. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 37-353 (1987).
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is the truth, I can't let you testify that it isn't true, and will have to tell the judge
if you do so," it's hard to imagine that a significant further incentive to dissemble
would be provided by adding, "and I can't pretend that it isn't true when I'm
questioning other witnesses either."'4
Another argument that could apply in both criminal and civil cases is an
argument that because discrediting truthful testimony may sometimes be the only
way to obtain an accurate determination of the ultimate facts of a case from the trier
of fact, there should be no rule against discrediting truthful testimony. In fact, a
generation of law students has been raised on Monroe Freedman's hypothetical of
a robbery defendant who "has been wrongly identified as the criminal, but correctly
identified by [a] nervous, elderly woman [witness] who wears eyeglasses, as having
been only a block away five minutes before the crime took place."'5
I have previously written at length about the innocent defendant argument, 6 and
will not repeat that discussion here. Suffice it to say that that argument might also
be relied on to permit the subornation, or at least nondisclosure, of perjury, which
might sometimes be necessary to counteract other truthful but misleading testimony;
and it could even be used to sanction the destruction of physical evidence, which
might sometimes tend to create a false impression. If it is clear to us that there
should be rules against such practices, which lawyers would have to disobey if they
felt sufficiently strongly about the justice of their clients' causes, 7 why wouldn't
we also want to have a rule against discrediting truthful testimony?
A final argument for allowing the discrediting practice would apply only to the
defense of criminal cases. The argument would be that discrediting truthful
testimony is just another legitimate way of putting the prosecution to its proof -
of making sure that the prosecution is not getting into a dangerous-to-the-innocent
habit of bringing criminal charges on weak evidence - which a defense lawyer is
14. Even apart from the perjury exception to confidentiality, Subin has concluded that given the
other exceptions, "No client could be confident - particularly when the information is of a suspect
nature - as to what could safely be revealed." Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of
Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1165 (1985). On the other hand, Andrew
Kaufman observed in 1981 that the exceptions were "still relatively confined and still relatively easy to
explain." Andrew L. Kaufman, Book Review, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1504, 1512 n.20 (1981).
15. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 48 (1975) (emphasis
added); see also Freedman, supra note 9, at 1474.
16. Carl M. Selinger, The Perry Mason Perspective and Others: A Critique ofReductionist Thinking
About the Ethics of Untruthful Practices by Lav,yers for "Innocent" Defendants, 6 HOFSTA L. REV. 631
(1978).
17. See id. at 660-62. Delaware Bar Association Professional Ethics Committee Op. 1988-2
provides, I believe, the first official recognition, as it were, of civil disobedience by lawyers:
Mhe lawyer's duty is non-disclosure [of information that his client has AIDS to a woman
with whom he is living]. If the lawyer's moral code is such that he cannot abide by this
duty, he may be pressed to the point of civil disobedience because obeying the letter of
the law may require him to sacrifice more of his principles than he can bear. If so, the
lawyer should inform his client of the decision to disclose and then be prepared to accept
discipline if he cannot convince the disciplinary authorities to read a "moral compulsion"
exception to the letter of Rule 1.6.
5 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 203 (1989).
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clearly permitted to do, under Model Rule 3.1, even on behalf of an admittedly
guilty client. While I have questioned elsewhere the supposed justifications for such
permission, 8 I do not believe that it is necessary to repudiate it in order to
condemn the discrediting practice. Again, Harry Subin explains the differences well:
In the [discrediting] situation ...the prosecution has presented the
strongest case possible, i.e. the truthful testimony of the victim of a
crime. In any case, it is one thing to attack a weak government case by
pointing out its weakness. It is another to attack a strong government
case by confusing the jury with falsehoods. Finally, as a proponent of
this "screening theory" concedes, there may be a danger that if the
prosecutor sees that the truth alone is inadequate, he or she may be
inspired to embellish it. That, of course, is not likely to make the
screening mechanism work better. 9
The Authorities Saying that Discrediting Truthful Testimony is Permissible
For the proposition that the law permits lawyers to try to discredit truthful
testimony, the Restatement's reporters rely mainly' on the later, 1979, version of
the A.B.A.'s Standards for the [Criminal] Defense Function,2 and on dicta-like
language from the dissenting and concurring opinion of Justice White, writing for
only two other justices, in the 1967 case of United States v. Wade.' In the 1979
version, Standard 4-7.6(b) said that, "A lawyer's belief or knowledge that the
witness is telling the truth does not preclude cross-examination, but should, if possi-
ble," it added, "be taken into consideration by counsel in conducting the cross-
examination." The still-newer 1992 version of the Standards just leaves off the
addition.'
The commentary to the 1979 version talked only about criminal cases; and it said
that a lawyer would be free to refrain from cross-examining or impeaching a
truthful witness only f refraining would not prevent the lawyer from offering an
effective defense - and "where the defendant has admitted guilt to the lawyer and
does not plan to testify, and the lawyer simply intends to put the state to its proof
and raise a reasonable doubt,, skillful cross-examination of the prosecution's
witnesses is essential."' Similarly, Justice White's opinion in the Wade case, treats
discrediting truthful testimony as a means of putting the prosecution to its proof:
[A]bsent a voluntary plea of guilty, we. . . insist that [defense counsel]
defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty .... Our interest in
18. Selinger, supra note 10.
19. Subin, supra note 7, at 148-49 (footnote omitted).
20. 1992 RESTATEMENt DRAFT, supra note 3, § 152 cmt. d reporter's note.
21. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1979)
[hereinafter 1979 STANDARDS].
22. 388 U.S. 218, 250 (1967).
23. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-7.6(b) (3d ed. 1992).
24. 1979 STANDARDS, Yupra note 21, at commentary to Standard 4-7.6(b).
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not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State to its proof,
to put the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he
thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are some limits
which defense counsel must observe but more often than not, defense
counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if
he can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth. . ..
Justice White is less than clear whether the discrediting practice he is talking
about is required or discretionary. But two things are clear with respect to the
authorities relied upon by the reporters, including also the three cited scholarly
commentaries: they all talk only about criminal cases; and all, save Monroe
Freedman, rest their cases on the "put the prosecution to its proof' argument, which
Model Rule 3.1 makes clear has no applicability outside the defense of criminal
cases, and amounts in civil cases to the unethical taking of a "frivolous" position.
And as for the merits of using the "put the prosecution to its proof' argument to
justify discrediting truthful testimony, what is it exactly that's wrong with a
prosecution case whose only weakness is that its truthful witnesses can be made to
look bad by skillful defense counsel?
What Good Would It Do to Prohibit Discrediting,
Much Less Say That the Law Implicitly Condemns It?
Even if a very specific prohibition on discrediting truthful testimony were to be
written into the Model Rules, it would be almost impossible to prove in any
particular case that a lawyer knew that the testimony in question was truthful. This
proof problem, coupled with the fact that a great many lawyers think that
discrediting is acceptable, might make it appear rather pointless for the
Restatement's reporters to say that existing law implicitly condemns the practice,
at least outside of the representation of criminal defendants. But I believe it might
do some good.
First, although the reporters have now made it reasonably clear in their 1992
Council Draft that lawyers do have discretion to refrain from trying to discredit
truthful testimony, many lawyers might assume from the language presently in the
draft that the practice is consistent nevertheless with the existing rules governing
trial advocacy - and that discretion is being granted to lawyers simply as a
concession to their personal squeamishness, or desire to be nice. The Code of
Professional Responsibility stated, for example, that lawyers do not show insuffi-
cient zealousness on behalf of their clients merely "by treating with courtesy and
consideration all persons involved in the legal process"; and we are living after
all at a time when it is fashionable to denounce "Rambo" litigation tactics, and
adopt lawyer "codes of civility."
But what's wrong with discrediting is not just that it's not nice: it also confounds
the premises of the adversary system, and especially our confemporary system -
25. Wade, 388 U.S. at 257-58 (footnote omitted).
26. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL" REsPONSIBILrry DR 7-101(A)(1) (1969).
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in which lawyers in the federal courts will probably soon be required to come
forward voluntarily (or at least without a discovery request) with certain kinds of
unfavorable truthful evidence, even if they learned about it in confidence from their
clients." Perhaps if the ALI says that discrediting is illegitimate, more lawyers will
exercise their discretion not to engage in the practice, and in the process more
thoughtful laypeople will come to have fewer doubts about the adversary system as
an instrument of justice.
Second, saying that the law implicitly condemns discrediting would help to make
clearer the applicability to borderline situations of the prohibition in Model Rule
3.4(b) against assisting a client or other witnesses in committing perjury. Lawyers
know already that they cannot advise a client to lie, or put a client on the stand who
by changing his/her story has implicitly conceded that he/she is going to lie. But
there is still the more subtle practice of preempting any such conflicts by telling the
client about the applicable law before the lawyer asks the client to tell his/her story,
so that the client learns in advance what it would be beneficial for him/her to say."
That practice, like discrediting, seems to depend for its claim to acceptability on a
notion that the appearance of a witness' testimony, as far as truth or falsity is
concerned, is as impo'tant, or more important, than the reality. The sooner we make
clear that that approach to testimony is intolerable, the better.
Third, even if the reporters were noncommittal about discreditin& truthful
testimony in criminal cases, declaring it off-limits in civil cases would help to
underline the proposition embodied in Model Rule 3.1, and Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, that putting an opponent to his/her proof has no place in
civil litigation. Even as late as the debates on the Model Rules, arguments were
made that civil defendants should have the same right as criminal defendants to put
their opponents to their proof; and CLE speakers from the personal injury defense
bar still sometimes seem to say that they have such a right. The discussion of
discrediting in the Restatement could make clear that as the only rationale in support
of the practice in bar association and judicial authority is one that applies only to
criminal cases, there is little basis for finding it acceptable outside of that context.
Fourth, and finally, condemning the discrediting of truthful testimony even in
criminal cases could help to set the criminal justice system on a new course that
would be more conducive to the rehabilitation of offenders. Monroe Freedman has
urged that we have a "purpose as a society.., to respect the humanity of the guilty
defendant,"'" and I couldn't agree more. But what in the world is truly respectful
about going along with a client's desire that you actively mislead other people, and
still worse, verbally mug an innocent witness? As Edwin Greenebaum has observed:
People with legal problems frequently have troubles, in part, because
they have difficulty in their relationships with others. Lawyering has
27. See Randall Samborn, Rules Changes Go to Congress, NAT'L L.J., May 3, 1993, at 3, 42.
28. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 143-60 (1990).
29. See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDuc. 11, 20 (1991).
30. FREEDMAN, supra note 28, at 17.
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therapeutic implications even when the lawyer is not a therapist. To
adopt a phrase, the attorney is either a part of the solution or a part of
the problem .... [Troubled individuals frequently view their world as
one where people exist principally to use each other and do not have
constructive, mutual relationships. The attorney who acquiesces in being
only a tool of such a client may be reinforcing those perceptions and
behaviors which tend to involve the client in difficult situations.3'
Thus, it may be very important for offenders, and especially for young offenders,
to see in the courtroom, and become a part of, even involuntarily, a different world
that operates according to a different and more humane set of values.
31. Edwin H. Greenebaum, Attorneys' Problems in Making Ethical Decisions, 52 IND. LJ. 627,635
(1977). It is not too difficult to imagine the reaction of a defendant who has finally revealed the
incriminatory truth to his/her lawyer, and is told by the lawyer, "I didn't hear you say that." See
FREEDMAN, supra note 28, at 130 n.85 (stating that Roy Cohn once proposed this tactic).
I have discussed elsewhere the question whether a defendant who found that his/her lawyer could not
engage in one or another untruthful practice on his/her behalf could justly complain of being penalized
not for telling a falsehood, but rather for having for once told the truth, to the lawyer. My conclusion
was that except perhaps in the case of simply putting the prosecution to its proof, such a claim was not
persuasive. Selinger, supra note 10, at 104-06.
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